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Abstract
In this paper, we report a puzzling result about the monetary expressions of labor
time (MELTs) of the productive and unproductive sectors. Since part of the aggregate
value produced in productive sectors is transferred to unproductive sectors, the productive sector’s MELT is a measure of value realized in productive sectors while the
unproductive sector’s MELT is a measure of value transferred to unproductive sectors.
Using the national income data for the U.S. economy during 1987-2016 and for the
Korean economy during 1993-2016, it is found that the MELT of the aggregate productive sector and the MELT of the aggregate unproductive sector have been moving
in a very close lockstep in both countries during the entire sample periods. We build a
model which explicitly formalizes the unproductive sector as not producing any value
but making the value production process efficient, and find that the co–movement of
the two MELTs is not an optimal condition. We also suggest some ex post implications
of it, including what the puzzling result implies on the relation between unproductive
sector and capital accumulation.
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Introduction

One of the contributions of the New Interpretation (NI) of Marxian labor theory of value is
to open up new research areas of empirical analyses of Marxian theory. Here, the monetary
expression of labor time (MELT) plays a central role. Based on the idea that money value
added results from expenditure of living labor, the NI proposes to adopt the equivalence
between the two as an axiom, and the associated proportionality coefficient is the MELT,
defined as aggregate money value added divided by total living labor time. Accordingly, as
long as certain assumptions are made regarding various differences among sectors, the MELT
can be a very useful tool to recover labor value variables from price variables simply by using
national account data.
In Foley (1986), the MELT is defined at the aggregate level only, with unproductive
labors excluded from the denominator. On the other hand, Rieu and Park (2018) extended
the NI framework to estimate the MELTs at the industry level with an explicit distinction
between productive versus unproductive industries. Note that in Marxian theory it is only
productive industries that produce value, while part of the value thus–produced is transferred
to unproductive industries. Accordingly, the MELT of the aggregate unproductive sector is
defined as the ratio of the total money value transferred to the unproductive sector against
total unproductive labor time, while the MELT of the aggregate productive sector is defined
as the ratio of the total money value remained and realized within the productive sector
against total productive labor time.
In this paper, using Rieu and Park (2018)’s approach, we estimated the MELT of the
aggregate productive sector and that of the aggregate unproductive sector of Korea for 1993–
2016 and of U.S. for 1987-2016. It was found, surprisingly, that the two time series of the
MELT moved quite closely for the entire sample periods in both economies. This puzzling
observation indicates that the volume of value transfer from the productive sector to the
unproductive sector — however it is determined — has been so as to make the MELT of
each sector evolve closely to each other.1 This leads us to ask if there is any equilibrium or
1

In the next section where the result is reported, we explain why it is a puzzle from the perspective of
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optimal level of value transfer between the productive and unproductive sectors, or if our
surprising finding is merely a coincidence.
To be more concrete, if the unproductive sector does not produce any value but only
spends the redistributed values — whether as consumption or investment — a question might
be raised at a fundamental level on why it exists and what its use is from the perspective
of the economic system as a whole, or using Marxian terminology, from the perspective of
total capital. But from the fact that the unproductive sector, which includes among others
wholesale and retail trades, real estate, and finance, etc., has been an essential part of any
capitalist economy, it follows that it must be the case that the unproductive sector is socially
necessary although it does not create any value, hence justifying the value transfer for its
maintenance. Then the next question is what an optimal size of the unproductive sector
would be, proxied by the value transfer to the latter and the unproductive labor time.
As a way to address these questions related to the unproductive sector from the perspective of the total capital, we build a model to derive the optimal levels of the value transfer
and the unproductive labor time; ‘optimal’ in the sense that they maximize the total profit
of the productive sector, which is assumed as the source of capital accumulation and growth.
One of the contributions of our model is to provide a formal definition of the unproductive
sector being socially necessary and to explicitly incorporate it into the model. More specifically, in our model, while the unproductive industries do not create any value, they are
socially necessary in the sense that they make the processes of creating value and surplus
value efficient. This contradictory nature of the unproductive sector plays a key role in the
model in deriving the optimal levels of the value transfer and the unproductive labor time.
The solution of the model demonstrates that the optimal levels of the MELTs of the
productive sector and the unproductive sector are not equal to each other, from which we
conclude that the two MELTs moving in close lockstep may not be an optimal condition.
Then, instead of further pursuing to provide a possible explanation of the puzzle, we take
an indirect route of using the model to identify its ex post implications. First, we conduct
comparative statics analysis to see how the optimal levels of the value transfer and unproMarx’s transformation procedure.

3

ductive labor time respond to a change in parameters of the model in an economy where our
puzzling empirical finding is observed. The results of the comparative statics analysis shed
light on the implication of the co–movement of the two MELTs on the distribution of value
between the productive and unproductive sectors.
Second, we take a more specific issue of how the contradictory nature of unproductive
sector relates to capital accumulation and growth. Since the productive sector does not produce values, it is common in the literature to view it as undermining the growth potential of
the system. For instance, using a two–sector model Dutt (1991) provides a Marxian explanation of stagnation caused by the growth of unproductive sector. By contrast, we explore the
possibility of capital accumulation and growth led by unproductive sector under a certain
condition.2 For this, we suggest the concept of unproductive sector–led phase, defined as a
phase where the economy can rely on expanding the unproductive sector for accumulation
and growth. In the important analytical result emerging from this framework, it matters
whether the economy is faced by labor supply constraint or not. On one hand, the economy with unconstrained labor supply is unambiguously unproductive sector–led regardless
of whether the co–movement of the MELTs of the productive and unproductive sectors is
observed or not. This result comes out as obvious mathematically, via the envelope theorem.
On the other hand, when the economy is constrained by labor supply, it depends on the
wage rate in the productive sector; if the productive sector wage rate is high relative to the
conditions which affect labor productivity in that sector, the economy can rely on the expansion of unproductive sector for capital accumulation and growth. That is, if the conditions
that affect the productive sector labor productivity in the economy constrained by labor
supply are sufficiently disadvantageous, the economy will be able to achieve accumulation
and growth by expanding the unproductive sector; but if the labor productivity conditions
in the productive sector are sufficiently favorable, the economy will achieve accumulation
and growth by shrinking the unproductive sector.
However, when the co–movement of the MELTs of the productive and unproductive
sectors is observed in the economy constrained by labor supply, the conditions that affect the
2

As will be seen below, the condition has to do with the wage rate in the productive sector.

4

productive sector labor productivity become unimportant in deciding whether the economy
is unproductive sector–led or not. The fact that the co–movement has been observed in the
economy constrained by labor supply implies that the accumulation property of the economy
in terms of productive versus unproductive sectors is not affected by the labor productivity
conditions of the productive sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start with reporting the puzzling result of
the MELTs of the productive and unproductive sectors in Korea and U.S. in section 2. Section
3 introduces the basic setup of the model. In section 4, an economy with unconstrained labor
supply is examined as the benchmark; we derive the optimal solution of the model and suggest
the concept of unproductive sector–led phase. We then move on to an economy constrained
by labor supply in section 5, derive the optimal solution, and examine whether the economy
is unproductive sector–led. Section 6 is conclusion.

2

A puzzle about the MELT

Let us first introduce notation. M V A denotes aggregate money value added and L denotes
total living labor time. In order to have the productive–unproductive distinction, we use
subscript P and U to indicate productive sector and unproductive sector, respectively.
According to the productive–unproductive distinction, it is only productive labor that
produces value and surplus value. Therefore, value and surplus value are produced only
within productive sectors, while unproductive sectors are fed by value transferred from the
productive sectors. Then we have
M V AP = M V A − M V AU

(1)

which is the value remained and realized within the productive sectors after the value transfer
to the unproductive sectors.
In this framework, three distinctive measures of the MELT can be defined as follows.
(i) m =

MV A
:
LP

(ii) mP =

value produced per productive labor time

M V AP
LP

: value realized, after value transfer, per productive labor time
5

Figure 1: The MELTs of productive vs. unproductive sectors
(a) Korea (1993–2016; KRW per hour)
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Under the assumption that all labors in productive sectors are productive while all labors
in unproductive sectors are unproductive — which is the assumption we adopt in this paper3
— m, the aggregate MELT, is a measure of aggregate value produced in the whole economy
by a given total productive labor time; mP , the productive sector MELT, is a measure
of total value realized within the productive sectors, after the value transfer, for a given
total productive labor time; mU , the unproductive sector MELT, is a measure of total value
transferred to unproductive sectors for a given total unproductive labor time. The relative
levels of mP and mU should be a matter of critical importance since in Marxian theory the
surplus value is the source of capital accumulation and growth of the system.
In this context, using the national account data of Korea for 1993–2016 and the national
account data of U.S. for 1987–2016, we estimated mP and mU to gauge the value transfer
between productive and unproductive sectors.4 The results are reported in figure 1. It is
3
4

Mohun (2006) separates between productive and unproductive labors within productive sectors.
The productive industries include agriculture, forestry, and fishery; mining; manufacturing; utilities;

construction; accommodation and food service; transportation and warehousing; information services; education service; arts and entertainment. The unproductive industries include wholesale/retail trade; finance,
insurance, real estate, rental and leasing; professional and business service; health care and social services;
other services except government.
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surprising that, during the protracted periods of time, both Korea and U.S. have seen the
MELT of productive sector and the MELT of unproductive sector closely tracking each other
to the extent that it almost holds that
mP = mU

(2)

Is this relation a consequence of some equilibrating mechanism or just a coincidence?
Of course, extending the data to see if the same puzzling relation would be observed in
other countries will get us closer to an answer to this question. But the observation of
mP = mU for both Korea and U.S. during the long sample period is puzzling enough to
bring us to investigate an underlying mechanism or economic implication. Whatever it may
be, the observation emphatically demonstrates that the volume of total value transferred to
unproductive sectors from productive sectors has been such that mP = mU holds. Then does
this imply that there is some ‘optimal’ level of value transfer at the aggregate level from the
perspective of long run stability of the macroeconomy?
That mP = mU is a puzzle is obvious from the perspective of Marxian transformation
procedure. Suppose an economy aggregated into productive and unproductive sectors, which
yields a two–sector model. Unless the organic composition of capital of each sector is equal to
one another, which takes place only by chance, the ratio between the two sectors’ money value
added and that between their value products will be different; hence mP 6= mU . Although
not reported here, we estimated the organic composition of capital, proxied by a capital stock
divided by total wage, of productive and unproductive sectors in Korea during 1993–2016
and verified an evident difference between the two sectors.5
In the rest of this paper, we propose an analytical approach that can be useful to address
some of the above–mentioned questions surrounding the puzzling result of (2).
Before proceeding, the unproductive sector’s total labor time relative to productive sector’s total labor time,

LU
,
LP

is illustrated in figure 2. An expansion of unproductive sectors

in terms of total work hours is clearly observed in both countries during the entire sample
periods.
5

The data can be provided upon request.
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U
Figure 2: The unproductive–productive sectors ratio of total labor time ( L
LP )
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A model: basic setup

In this section, we introduce the basic setup of a model to investigate the implications of
unproductive sector and its expansion in relation to value and surplus value production,
capital accumulation, and growth.
First of all, the total value produced by productive labors for a given m is
M V A = mLP

(3)

On the other hand, the profit realized in the productive sectors, which we suppose to be the
only source for capital accumulation and growth of the system, is expressed as, by definition,
ΠP = M V AP − wP LP . Then, using equations (3), (1), and M V AU = mU LU , we get an
expression for the productive sector profits.
ΠP = mLP − mU LU − wP LP

(4)

Equation (4) schematically reflects the Marxian concept of productive vs. unproductive
labors; whether productive or unproductive, all types of labor incur cost and hence are a
pressure on capital profitability — see the second and third terms on the right–hand side; on
the other hand, the productive labors produce value and surplus value — see the first term
on the right–had side — while this is not the case for the unproductive labors; the latter
simply subtract from value and surplus value produced by the productive labors.
8

Note that the total value transfer to the unproductive sectors from the productive sectors,
measured by M V AU = mU LU , has two components, i.e. the unproductive labor time LU and
the value transfer per unit unproductive labor time mU . An increase in LU with other things
being equal can be viewed as a quantitative expansion of the unproductive sector, whereas
an increase in mU for given LU may reflect an enhancement in technological and market
condition of the unproductive sectors and hence can be viewed as a qualitative expansion of
the unproductive sector.
Whether qualitative or quantitative, however, equation (4) emphasizes that an expansion
of the unproductive sector is a drain on the source of capital accumulation, i.e. profits, and
thus lowers the growth of the system. However, it is recognized in the literature that there
are some aspects of unproductive labors which make them ‘socially necessary’. For instance,
Smith (1993) maintains that some unproductive labors are ‘socially necessary’ and hence
should be considered as overhead costs. On the other hand, Olsen (2015) suggests that
unproductive labors, while squeezing profits and hence lowering growth, also exert some
countering effect through increasing work intensity and developing productivity enhancing
technical change.
In this context, we propose to characterize the unproductive sector — measured not only
by unproductive labor but also by the value transfer — as ‘socially necessary’ in the sense
that it makes the process of production of value and surplus value efficient.6 To express this
formally, let m be a function of mU and LU in addition to other variables that positively
affect m which we denote by a comprehensive variable α.
m = m(mU , LU , α)
where

∂m
∂α

(5)

> 0 holds. α captures technological and market conditions of the productive sector,

which enhance the value creating capacity of any given productive labor time.7
As for the impact of mU and LU on m, we adopt the following assumptions.
6
7

We are using ‘efficient’ in the usual sense of the word as a nuanced expression only for the convenience.
Remember that the technological and market conditions of the unproductive sector are reflected in the

determination of mU .
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Assumption 1

∂m
∂mU

> 0: For given LU , an increase (a decrease) in the value transferred to

unproductive sectors makes the value creation by productive labors more (less) efficient.
Assumption 2

∂m
∂LU

> 0: For given mU , i.e. when the value transferred to unproductive

sectors per unproductive labor time is constant, an increase (a decrease) in unproductive
labor time makes the value creation per productive labor time more (less) efficient.
Under these two assumptions, both qualitative and quantitative expansions of the unproductive sector make the value production by the productive labor efficient; the unproductive
sector contributes to the value production in this sense. That is, while the productive labor
directly contributes to the value production, the unproductive labor’s contribution is only
indirect. It is in this way that we characterize the unproductive sector as socially necessary
and adopt the following definition.
Definition 1 Unproductive sectors are socially necessasry insofar as assumptions 1 and 2
hold; i.e.

∂m
∂mU

> 0 and

∂m
∂LU

> 0. The levels of

∂m
∂mU

and

∂m
∂LU

are a measure of the degree by

which the value transfer and the unproductive labors, respectively, make the value production
per productive labor efficient.
Now, recalling the questions raised in section 1 regarding the relation of mP = mU , in
order to see whether there are some kind of ‘optimal’ magnitudes of unproductive sector and
value transfer and how they are determined, we choose mU and LU as two key unknowns
with wP and LP taken as given. Once mU and LU are found, m and ΠP will be known from
equations (5) and (4), and finally we will be able to get mP from its definition:
mP =

mLP − mU LU
LP

(6)

In this context, let us suppose the existence of what Engels (1970) calls the ideal personification of the total national capital (ideeller Gesamtkapitalist), a hypothetical agent
who decides the level of mU and LU that maximize profit of total capital. Of course a decentralized market economy doesn’t have such a social optimizer. We use the optimization
of the total capital as a counter–factual method to examine what type of relation between
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productive and unproductive sectors would be desirable from the bird’s eye view of the total
capital and investigate the implication.
In analyzing this optimization problem, we consider two cases in turn; an economy with
unconstrained labor supply and an economy constrained by labor supply. When there is
labor supply constraint, a quantitative expansion of unproductive sector, i.e. an increase in
unproductive labor time, diminishes the pool of labor for productive employment, while this
is not the case when there is no such constraint. Underdeveloped and developing countries
with huge non–capitalist sectors, which may be the source of elastic labor supply to industrialized cities, are an example of an economy with unconstrained labor supply. On the other
hand, developed countries where such non–capitalist sectors are very small are likely to be
an economy constrained by labor supply, although the constraint can possibly be relaxed by,
for example, immigration, female participation in labor force, etc.

4

An economy with unconstrained labor supply

We first consider an economy with unconstrained labor supply.

4.1

Optimal value transfer

The optimization problem of ‘ideeller Gesamtkapitalist’ is as follows.
max

mU ,LU

ΠP = m(mU , LU , α)LP − mU LU − wP LP

The solution is summarized in lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The optimal solution of the model economy with unconstrained labor supply:
∂m
LP
∂mU
∂m
m∗U =
LP
∂LU
∂m ∂m
m∗P = m∗ −
LP
∂mU ∂LU
L∗U =

m∗ = m(L∗U , m∗U , α)
11

(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

Π∗P = m∗ LP −

∂m ∂m 2
L − wP LP
∂mU ∂LU P

(11)

Proof. From the first order conditions
∂ΠP
∂m
=
LP − LU = 0
∂mU
∂mU
∂ΠP
∂m
=
LP − mU = 0
∂LU
∂LU
we obtain L∗U and m∗U . The rest can be shown by substituting m∗ , m∗U , and L∗U to equations
(4), (5), and (6).
The idea behind the solution of the two choice variables is clear and intuitive. As the
unproductive sectors make the value creation of productive labor more (less) efficient, the
number of unproductive labor, LU , and the value transfer to the unproductive sectors, mU ,
for a given LP will be great (smaller). Probably the rising trends of
displayed in figure 2 reflect an increase in

∂m
∂mU

LU
LP

in Korea and U.S. as

due to technological innovations, that took

place in unproductive sectors during last decades.8 The levels of mU and LU beyond (8) and
(7) are suboptimal, crowding out capital accumulation and growth, and will be considered
as ‘too big’. Some of the findings that financial sector crowds out real economic growth, such
as Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015), may be understood in this context.
Corollary 1, which presents an interesting result about an economy without an unproductive sector, directly follows from the optimal solution in lemma 1.
Corollary 1 In an economy with unconstrained labor supply, if
(i)

L∗U

= 0 and

m∗U

= 0, and (ii)

Π∗P

R 0 as long as

m∗P

∂m
∂mU

= 0 and

∂m
∂LU

= 0, then

R wP .

Proof. On one hand, (i) is immediate from (7) and (8). On the other hand, it is confirmed
from (9) that m∗P = m∗ and from (11), due to m∗P = m∗ , that Π∗P = (m∗P − wP )LP ; (ii) is
immediate from the latter.
Part (i) of corollary 1 implies that if the unproductive sectors were not socially necessary
in the sense of definition 1, the unproductive labors would not exist and consequently there
8

Think about innovations that took place in financial intermediation and retail trade (e.g. Amazon.com),

both of which being the two major unproductive sectors.
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would be no value transfer to the unproductive sectors; part (ii) implies, nonetheless, profit
will still be produced as long as the wage rate is not so high as to eliminate profit.9
The most important result from the optimal solution in lemma 1 is to verify m∗P 6= m∗U ,
which tells us that the relation mP = mU observed in Korea and U.S. is not established as
an optimal condition. Then, instead of further pursuing to identify an underlying mechanism
of mP = mU , we now turn to clarifying its ex post implication. Let us start with expressing
the definition M V A = M V AP + M V AU at the optimum as
m∗ LP = m∗P LP + m∗U L∗U

(12)

e∗ = m
e∗ )
f∗ LP = m
f∗U LP + m
f∗U L
f∗U (LP + L
m
U
U

(13)

Imposing m∗U = m∗P gives

Throughout the paper, the variables under the condition of mU = mP are denoted with tilde.
Meanwhile, according to the definition of the optimal total profit of productive sectors
under the condition of m∗U = m∗P , we get
e ∗ , α)L − m
e∗ − w L = m
f∗ (m
f∗U , L
f∗U L
f∗U LP − wP LP
m
P
P P
U
U

(14)

The left–hand side is the value function of ideeller Gesamtkapitalist’s optimization problem and the right–hand side is obtained from the definition of the optimal total profit of
productive sectors, m∗P LP − wP LP with m∗U = m∗P extrapolated.
Now, using the envelope theorem, we obtain some interesting comparative statics results
with respect to the parameters α and LP .10
Proposition 1 In an economy with unconstrained labor supply where m∗P = m∗U holds, it
follows that
9

f∗U
∂m
∂m
=
∂α
∂α

(15)

For an economy constrained by labor supply discussed below, we obtain a stronger result where the wage

rate is always set at the level that eliminates all the profit.
10
The comparative statics with respect to another parameter of the model, wP , generates a trivial result.
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Proof. Taking the derivative of both sides of (14) w.r.t α yields
side, where the enveloped theorem is used, and
obtain

∂m
∂α

=

∂ m∗U

e

∂α

∂m
L
∂α P

for the left–hand

LP for the right–hand side; we eventually

∂m
e ∗U
.
∂α

Proposition 1 states that when m rises (falls) due to an improvement (worsening) of the
technological and market conditions of the productive sector, mU also rises (falls) by the
same degree. This means that since mP = mU , a variation of the technological and market
conditions of the productive sector will make all the MELTs, m, mP , and mU , change by the
exact same amount. This result gauges the way in which the additional value production,
generated by technological innovations and market condition improvement of the productive
sector, is shared between the productive and unproductive sectors.
Proposition 2 In an economy with unconstrained labor supply where m∗P = m∗U holds, it
follows that
e∗
f∗U LP
L
∂m
U
=
f∗U
LP
∂LP m

(16)

Proof. Taking the derivative of both sides of (14) w.r.t LP yields m − wP for the left–hand
side, where the envelope theorem is used, and

∂m
e ∗U
L
∂LP P

f∗U − wP for the right–hand side;
+m

we eventually obtain
f∗U
m−m

f∗U
∂m
=
LP
∂LP

(17)

f∗U to make the right–hand side an elasticity,
Dividing both sides by m
f∗U
f∗U LP
m−m
∂m
=
f∗U
f∗U
m
∂LP m

Using (13), the above expression can be rewritten as

e∗U
L
LP

(18)
=

∂m
e ∗U LP
∂LP m
e ∗U .

f∗U in response to LP equals the ratio between
According to proposition 2, the elasticity of m

unproductive and productive labor time. That is, as the relative importance of unproductive
labor time in total employed population gets heightened, the total money value added, which
has risen due to an increase in productive labor time, tends to be more easily transferred to
unproductive sectors. This result motivates a political interpretation of the dynamic between
productive and unproductive labors surrounding the distribution of surplus value.
14

4.2

Unproductive sector and capital accumulation

To be more concrete about the ex post implication of mP = mU , we tackle a critical issue on
how unproductive sectors relate to capital accumulation and growth. For this, let us hypothesize an economy in a phase where capital accumulation and growth are led by unproductive
sectors. To capture this idea, we introduce the concept of ‘unproductive sector–led phase’;
for this, m in (5) needs to be specified as a linear function such as
m = β1 mU + β2 LU + β3 α
Note that β1 ≡

∂m
∂mU

and β2 ≡

∂m
∂LU

β1 , β2 , β3 > 0

(19)

are the two measures of the degree by which unpro-

ductive sectors — measured by either mU or LU — make the production of value efficient as
discussed in definition 1. Since an increase in LU is a quantitative expansion of the unproductive sector while an increase in mU for give LU is a qualitative expansion of the unproductive
sector, β1 can be called the qualitative effect of unproductive sector efficiency and β2 the
quantitative effect of unproductive sector efficiency. Similarly, β3 measures the efficiency of
productive sector’s technological and market conditions in value production and hence can
be called the qualitative effect of productive sector efficiency.
These efficiency coefficients, β1 , β2 , and β3 , are the deep parameters of the model that
measure more structural aspects of the contributions mU , LU , and α make to increasing m.
In the definition of the unproductive sector–led phase suggested in this paper, we focus on
how the two efficiency coefficients of the unproductive sector, β1 and β2 , affect the productive
sector’s profits, which are the source of accumulation and growth.
Definition 2 Suppose a linear specification of m as in (19). An economy is said to be
unproductive sector–led if both of the following two conditions hold simultaneously:
∂Π∗P
> 0 and
∂β1

∂Π∗P
>0
∂β2

with at least one of them holding with strong inequality.
According to definition 2, an economy is said to be unproductive sector–led when an improvement of either the qualitative or the quantitative effect of unproductive sector efficiency
raises the optimal profit of productive sector while neither lowers it.
15

Now, before proceeding to examine whether an economy where mP = mU holds is unproductive sector–led, we first consider the general case without mP = mU as a reference
point; the result is summarized in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 According to definition 2, the economy with unconstrained labor supply is
unproductive sector–led since
∂Π∗P
= β2 L2P > 0
∂β1
∂Π∗P
= β1 L2P > 0
∂β2
Proof. Under the linear specification of m as in (19), Π∗P in (11) is rewritten as
Π∗P = β0 LP + β1 β2 L2P + β3 αLP − wP LP
The results in proposition 3 immediately follow.
What about the economy where mP = mU holds? To check this, we have to first impose
m∗P = m∗U to the optimal solutions listed in lemma 1. The consequently revised solutions are
listed in lemma 2.
Lemma 2 In an economy with unconstrained labor supply, the optimal solution under the
condition of m∗P = m∗U :
e∗ = β L
L
1 P
U

(20)

f∗U = β2 LP
m

(21)

f∗P = β2 LP
m

(22)

f∗ = β2 (1 + β1 )LP
m

(23)

e ∗ = β L2 − w L
Π
2 P
P P
P

(24)

Using equation (24), we can verify whether the economy in question is unproductive
sector–led. The result is summarized in proposition 4.
Proposition 4 According to definition 2, an economy unconstrained by labor supply where
m∗P = m∗U is observed is unproductive sector–led since
e∗
∂Π
P
=0
∂β1
e∗
∂Π
P
= L2P > 0
∂β2
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Proof. The results immediately follow from (24).
Propositions 3 and 4 combined together state that in the economy with unconstrained
labor supply, regardless of whether mU = mP holds or not, is unproductive sector–led in the
sense that an improvement in the qualitative or the quantitative effect of the unproductive
sector efficiency or both leads to an increase in the capital profitability. That is, the economy
with unconstrained labor supply can always improve capital accumulation and growth by
relying on the unproductive sectors’ socially necessary character of making the production
of value and surplus value efficient.
In fact, this result is obvious mathematically. Consider the productive sector profits in
(4), which is the object function of the optimization problem. By using the envelope theorem,
it can be readily confirmed that as long as m has a linear function as in (19), an increase in
β1 or in β2 will unambiguously raise the profit; hence unproductive sector–led.
It can be concluded that in an economy with unconstrained labor supply the condition
mP = mU does not have any significant implication regarding the relation between capital
accumulation and unproductive sector. But the matter is different when we turn to an
economy constrained by labor supply as will be discussed in the next section.

5

An economy constrained by labor supply

For developed and mature economies such as South Korea and U.S., it is more realistic to
assume labor supply elasticity to be quite small. In this section we consider an economy
constrained by labor supply; in contrast to the economy dealt with in the previous section,
now the total labor supply is fixed and as a consequence an increase in the unproductive
labor time reduces the productive labor time.
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5.1

Optimal value transfer

In the economy constrained by labor supply, the ‘ideeller Gesamtkapitalist’ solves the following constrained optimization problem.
max

ΠP = m(mU , LU , α)LP − mU LU − wP LP

s.t.

L̄ = LP + LU

mU ,LU

which is simplified to
max

mU ,LU

ΠP = m(mU , LU , α)(L̄ − LU ) − mU LU − wP (L̄ − LU )

The solution is summarized in lemma 3.
Lemma 3 The optimal solution of the model economy constrained by labor supply:
L∗U =
m∗U =

1
1

∂m
∂mU
∂m
+ ∂m
U
∂m
∂LU
∂m
+ ∂m
U

L̄

(25)

L̄ + wP − m∗ (m∗U , L∗U , α)

(26)

m∗ = m(m∗U , L∗U , α)


m∗P = m∗ 1 +
Π∗P

∂m
∂mU

∗



(27)
− wP

= (m − wP )L̄ − 

 ∂m ∂m 

∂m
U
L̄
− ∂mU ∂L
∂m
∂mU
1 + ∂m
U

∂m ∂m
∂mU ∂LU

1+

∂m
∂mU

2

2 L̄

(28)
(29)

Proof. From the first–order conditions
∂ΠP
∂m
=
(L̄ − LU ) − LU = 0
∂mU
∂mU
∂ΠP
∂m
=
(L̄ − LU ) − m − mU + wP = 0
∂LU
∂LU
we obtain m∗U and L∗U . The rest follows immediately.
The result for L∗U in equation (25), on one hand, is identical to the one in (7) of the
unconstrained optimization problem, i.e. higher
18

∂m
,
∂mU

higher LU for a given LP , corresponding

to the observation illustrated in figure 2. On the other hand, m∗U in equation (26) is not in a
closed–form. Therefore, the existence and uniqueness of the solution m∗U needs to be verified,
which is done in lemma 4.
Lemma 4 In the case of an economy constrained labor supply, the unique solution m∗U exists.
Proof. Let g(x; · · · ) =

∂m
∂LU
∂m
1+ ∂m
U

L̄+wP −m∗ (x, L∗U , α), which is the right–hand side of equation

(26) with m∗U replaced by some variable x. Since g is continuous and monotonic, according to
a fixed point theorem, there exists a fixed point x̄ such that g(x̄) = x̄, and we have x̄ = m∗U .

As a comparison to corollary 1, here we consider an absence of unproductive sector in an
economy constrained by labor supply. The result is summarized as follows.
Corollary 2 In an economy constrained by labor supply, if

∂m
∂mU

= 0 and

∂m
∂LU

= 0, then not

only (i) m∗U = 0 and L∗U = 0, but also, in comparison to part (ii) of corollary 1, (ii) Π∗P = 0.
Proof. Suppose

∂m
∂mU

= 0 and

∂m
∂LU

= 0. On one hand, L∗U = 0 is immediate from (25). On

the other hand, we obtain from (28) m∗P = m∗ which, when substituted into the definition
of mP in (6), gives
as

M V A∗U
L̄−L∗U

m∗U L∗U
L̄−L∗U

= 0. The latter, due to the definition m∗U ≡

= 0 or, since L∗U = 0,

A∗U

MV
L̄

M V A∗U
,
L∗U

is rewritten

= 0, which finally implies M V A∗U = 0 and thus

m∗U = 0.11 We also obtain from (26) m∗U = wP − m∗ which, due to m∗U = 0 and m∗P = m∗ ,
implies wP = m∗P . Finally, with the help of m∗P = m∗ , (29) is simplified to, Π∗P = (m∗P −wP )L̄,
which, due to wP = m∗P , yields Π∗P = 0.
Corollary 2 suggests that in an economy constrained by labor supply, when the unproductive sectors are not socially necessary in the sense of definition 1, it is not only that the
unproductive sectors will not exist but also that no profit will be produced. For a comparison, recall corollary 1 for the economy with unconstrained labor supply where the result of
11

m∗U = 0 can be derived from a slightly different approach. According to the definition m∗U ≡

would be more precise to note that
L∗U

m∗U

cannot be defined since

L∗U

M V A∗
U
L∗
U

, it

= 0. This can be interpreted as follows:

= 0 is equivalent to a complete absence of the unproductive sector unless the latter is characterized by

full automation technology; and the value transfer to a sector that does not exist would be a non sequitur.
In this context, m∗U = 0 would be a reasonable take.
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an absence of unproductive sector is Π∗P R 0 if and only if m∗P R wP . According to corollary
2, however, in the economy constrained by labor supply, the result of an absence of unproductive sector is always m∗P = wP and hence Π∗P = 0.12 Since mP = m measures the value
production of a given productive labor time when there is no unproductive sector, corollary 2
suggests that when an economy constrained by labor supply doesn’t have any unproductive
sector, the wage rate tends to be at the level, which allows the workers to glean everything
they produce, leaving nothing for capital.
Corollary 2 can be compared to the result of Okishio (2001)’s two–sector model, which
shows that when the labor supply is fixed, competition among capital makes the real wage
rate equal to labor productivity thereby bringing the exploitation rate and hence the profit
rate to zero. Okishio’s model does not explicitly formalize an unproductive sector and therefore it can be considered as replicating a system without unproductive sector. But the model
has a labor market where the real wage rate is determined.
In comparison, our model demonstrates the same result without modeling the labor
market. Because of that, however, i.e. because our model does not have a labor market to
determine the wage rate, corollary 2 does not indicate that

∂m
∂mU

> 0 and

∂m
∂LU

> 0 will

guarantee a positive profit. The reason is that as can be seen from the expression for Π∗P in
(29), whether Π∗P > 0 will hold in that case depends on the specific values of the parameters
including wage rate. That is, even when

∂m
∂mU

> 0 and

∂m
∂LU

> 0, Π∗P 6 0 is possible if wP is

too high.
Another side of the same story is that

∂m
∂mU

> 0 and

∂m
∂LU

> 0 can prevent the economy

constrained by labor supply from experiencing zero profit as long as the wage rate is not too
high. This way of understanding corollary 1 adds to the content of our characterization of
the unproductive sector as socially necessary as described in definition 1. It suggests that
in the economy constrained by labor supply the existence of unproductive sector makes it
possible for the economy to avoid zero productive sector profits, which would be impossible
without the unproductive sector.
12

Remember from corollaries 1 and 2 that for both types of economy m∗P = m∗ holds when there is no

unproductive sector since in that situation M V A∗U = 0 will be the case.
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Moving on to our main issue on the relation of mP = mU , recall from section 4 that the
relation was not an optimal condition for an economy with unconstrained labor supply. We
can now verify from lemma 3 that m∗P 6= m∗U and hence that mP = mU is not an optimal
condition for an economy constrained by labor supply, either. Then, as we did in section 4,
let us extrapolate m∗P = m∗U to investigate ex post implications of mP = mU .
First of all, under the condition of L̄ = LP + LU , equation (14) is rewritten as
e∗ )
e ∗ ) = (m
e ∗ − w (L̄ − L
e ∗ , α)(L̄ − L
e∗ ) − m
f∗U − wP )(L̄ − L
f∗U L
f∗ (m
f∗U , L
m
P
U
U
U
U
U

(30)

Remember that tilde denotes the variable under the condition of m∗U = m∗P , and that the
left–hand side is the value function of ideeller Gesamtkapitalist’s optimization problem and
the right–hand side is obtained from the definition of the optimal total profit of productive
sectors, m∗P LP − wP LP with m∗U = m∗P extrapolated.
We obtain an interesting comparative statics result with respect to the parameter α.13
Proposition 5 In an economy constrained by labor supply where m∗P = m∗U holds, it follows
that

e∗
f∗U
∂L
∂m
∂m
U
Q 0 ⇐⇒
R
∂α
∂α
∂α

(31)

Proof. Taking the derivative of both sides of (30) w.r.t α yields
hand side, where the envelope theorem is used, and

∂m
e ∗U
(L̄
∂α

e∗ )
−L
U

∂m
e ∗ ) for the left–
(L̄ − L
U
∂α
e∗U
∂L
∗
fU − wP ) for the
− ∂α (m

e ∗ eventually gives
right–hand side. Dividing both sides by L̄ − L
U
 ∗
 e∗
f∗U
f U − wP ∂ L
∂m
∂m
m
U
=
−
∗
e
∂α
∂α
∂α
L̄ − LU

(32)


Since L̄ > LU by definition and mU > wP is most likely in any viable economy,

m
e ∗U −wP

e∗U
L̄−L



>0

holds and hence the relation in proposition 5 follows.
In comparison to the result

∂m
∂α

=

∂m
e ∗U
∂α

in proposition 1 for the economy with uncon-

strained labor supply, proposition 5 for the economy constrained by labor supply implies
13

Concerning the comparative statics with respect to another parameter L̄, which corresponds to propo-

sition 2, we were not able to obtain any meaningful result.
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∂m
∂α

=

∂m
e ∗U
∂α

f∗U = wP and, otherwise,
only when m

∂m
∂α

6=

∂m
e ∗U
.
∂α

Proposition 5 states that when

α improves, the unproductive labor time will increases (decrease) if and only if the consequent increase in the value transfer to the unproductive sector is larger (smaller) than the
consequent increase in the total value production.

5.2

Unproductive sector and capital accumulation

Similarly to section 4.2, we examine ex post implication of mU = mP in relation to capital
accumulation, by employing the concept of unproductive sector–led as suggested in definition
2. Since definition 2 requires the linear specification of m, we adopt (19) in this section as
well. In that case, the optimal profit of productive sector in (29) is rewritten as
Π∗P

β0 + β3 α − wP
β1 β2
L̄ L̄
=
+
1 + β1
(1 + β1 )2




(33)

Now, as a reference point, let us first examine the general case without mU = mP ; the
result is summarized as follows.
Proposition 6 According to definition 2, the economy constrained by labor supply is unproductive sector–led when wP is at least as high as a certain threshold since
∂Π∗P
β2 (1 − β1 )
L̄
R 0 ⇐⇒ wP R β0 + β3 α −
∂β1
1 + β1
∂Π∗P
β1
=
L̄2 > 0
∂β2
(1 + β1 )2

(34)
(35)

Proof. The results immediately follow from (33).
Proposition 6 states that when an economy constrained by labor supply is in a phase with
too high a wage rate, it tends to rely, for accumulation and growth, on the unproductive
sectors’ socially necessary character of making the production of value and surplus value
efficient.
The reason why the wage rate matters here especially in relation to the impact of β1
as shown in (34) — in contrast to the results in propositions 3 and 4, where there is no
such condition — is due to the existence of labor supply constraint. When the economy
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is constrained by labor supply, an expansion of the unproductive sector in terms of labor
hour generates an effect that was absent in the case of an economy with unconstrained labor
supply, i.e. a reduction in labor hours available for productive employment. In this case, too
high a wage rate exerts an additional pressure on the profit.
This is the key to understanding the formal result of proposition 6. For the first condition
(34) of proposition 6, consider an improvement in β1 the qualitative effect of unproductive
sector efficiency; from lemma 3 we can verify that it will lead to an increase in L∗U , which
was also true in the case of an economy unconstrained by labor supply — see lemma 1,
remembering

∂m
∂mU

≡ β1 . When there is the labor supply constraint, the result of the increase

in L∗U is a reduction in L∗P ≡ L̄ − L∗U . Since the productive labor is the only genuine source
of value production, the reduction in L∗P lowers the money value added and essentially has
a negative impact on the capital accumulation. But when the wage rate is so high as to
significantly undermine the productive sector’s profitability, the reduction in L∗P makes the
consequent saving of total wage cost sufficiently strong enough to outweigh its negative effect
of lowering the money value added, thereby ultimately raising the profitability. This explains
how the economy constrained by labor supply is unproductive sector–led when the wage rate
is too high.
Our model treats the wage rate as constant and does not explain why it could be high or
low. There could be various reasons for the wage variation. For one, the notable real wage
growth during the post–war period was founded on strong trade union, welfare state policies,
etc. The result was an erosion of capital profitability and the profit rate hitting the historic
low in early 1980’s, which brought about a capital flight to an alternative, easier source of
profit, i.e. finance — which is the predominant section of unproductive sector. This line of
profit squeeze explanation of the emergence of the so–called neoliberal regime dominated by
financial sector is well explained by proposition 6.
Concerning the wage rate threshold β0 + β3 α −

β2 (1−β1 )
L̄
1+β1

in the first condition (34) of

proposition 6, α and its coefficient β3 , among the other parameters, are noteworthy. If either
of the two or both are sufficiently weak (strong) such that wP is greater (smaller) than the
threshold, the condition will (will not) be satisfied and the economy will (will not) be un23

productive sector–led. That is, if the technological and market conditions of the productive
sector are sufficiently unfavorable or their efficiency in contributing to value production is
sufficiently weak, the economy can rely on the expansion of unproductive sector for accumulation and growth; otherwise, expanding the unproductive sector will rather dampen the
productive sector profits.
Since the technology and market conditions are essential factors that affect labor productivity, the wage rate condition discussed above highlights that whether the wage rate
is high or low relatively to the labor productivity is central in determining the economy’s
accumulation property in terms of productive vs. unproductive sector. That is, if the productive sector’s wage rate is high relative to the labor productivity in that sector, the economy
constrained by labor supply tends to be unproductive sector–led; otherwise, the economy
will not be unproductive sector–led.
Let us now turn to our main question on the relation between capital accumulation and
unproductive sector for the economy where mP = mU is observed. For this, we impose
m∗P = m∗U on the optimal solutions listed in lemma 3. The consequently revised solutions
are listed in lemma 5.
Lemma 5 In an economy constrained by labor supply, the optimal solution under the condition of m∗P = m∗U :
β1
L̄
1 + β1
wP
β2 L̄
=
+
(1 + β1 )(2 + β1 ) 2 + β1
β2 L̄
wP
=
+
(1 + β1 )(2 + β1 ) 2 + β1
β2 L̄ + (1 + β1 )wP
=
2 + β1


β2 L̄ − wP
β1 β2
=
L̄ −
L̄2
2
2 + β1
(1 + β1 )

e∗ =
L
U

(36)

f∗U
m

(37)

f∗P
m
f∗
m
e∗
Π
P

(38)
(39)
(40)

Now we are ready to examine whether an economy constrained by labor supply exhibiting
m∗P = m∗U is unproductive sector–led. The result is summarized in proposition 7.
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Proposition 7 According to definition 2, the economy where m∗P = m∗U is observed is unproductive sector–led in case wP is at least as high as a certain threshold since
e∗
∂Π
(1 − β1 )(2 + β1 )2
P
R 0 ⇐⇒ wP R β2 L̄ 1 +
∂β1
(1 + β1 )3


e∗
∂Π
L̄2
P
=
>0
∂β2
(2 + β1 )(1 + β1 )2



(41)

(42)

Proof. The results immediately follow from (40).
In exactly the same way as proposition 6, proposition 7 states that when the economy
constrained by labor supply where mP = mU holds suffers from too high a wage rate relative
to a certain threshold, capital accumulation and growth can be achieved by relying on the
unproductive sectors’ socially necessary character of making the production of value and
surplus value efficient. But there is one important difference, which has to do with the wage
rate threshold. Remember that α and β3 played an important role in interpreting the wage
rate threshold in proposition 6 for the general case without m∗P = m∗U . By contrast, these
parameters are absent in the wage rate threshold in the case of the economy where m∗P = m∗U
holds. Remembering that α captures the technological and market conditions of productive
sector, this result implies that the conditions of the productive sector, which affect labor
productivity in that sector, are inessential in determining whether the economy constrained
by labor supply is unproductive sector–led or not.
Proposition 6, along with proposition 7, provides an important implication about the
puzzling relation of mP = mU . The fact that mP = mU has been observed in an economy
constrained by labor supply implies that the economy can be either unproductive sector–led
or not, depending on whether the wage rate is sufficiently high or low, but regardless of
the labor productivity conditions of the productive sector. The observation of mP = mU
indicates that the impact the labor productivity conditions of the productive sector have
on the economy’s accumulation property in terms of productive vs. unproductive sectors, is
neutralized.
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6

Conclusion

mP = mU is a puzzle from the perspective of Marxian transformation procedure. And that
mP = mU is observed in two countries quite consistently for around two to three decades
— which are not short — is surprising. After posing a question whether the observation
made in Korea and U.S. is an consequence of some equilibriating or optimizing mechanism,
or simply a coincidence, we have derived a tentative answer that at least the co–movement
of the two MELTs is not an optimal condition. Then, instead of further pursuing to find an
explanation of the underlying mechanism, we took an indirect strategy of providing some ex
post implications of the puzzling finding. They are summarized as follows.
First, in the economy with unconstrained labor supply where mP = mU holds, when m
rises (falls) due to an improvement (worsening) of the technology and market conditions of
the productive sector, mU also rises (falls) by the same degree. Since mP = mU , technology
innovations and market condition improvement of the productive sector will make all of the
MELTs, m, mP , and mU , increase by the exact same amount.
Second, in the economy with unconstrained labor supply where mP = mU holds, the
elasticity of mU in response to a change in the productive labor time equals the ratio between
unproductive and productive labor time; that is, if the unproductive labor time as a share
of total labor time is larger, the increase in the productive labor time will lead to a greater
value transfer to the unproductive sector.
Third, in the economy constrained by labor supply where mP = mU holds, when the
technology and market conditions of the productive sector improves, the unproductive labor
time will increases (decrease) if and only if the consequent increase in the value transfer to
the unproductive sector is larger (smaller) than the consequent increase in the total value
production.
The fourth regards a growth implication of the unproductive sector. For the economy
constrained by labor supply in general, when the wage rate in the productive sector is high
relative to the conditions that affect the productive sector labor productivity, the economy
can rely on the expansion of unproductive sector for capital accumulation and growth. In
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contrast, for the special case where mP = mU holds, the labor productivity conditions in the
productive sector become unimportant in deciding whether the productive sector wage rate
is high or low and hence whether the economy is unproductive sector–led or not.
The paper can be developed in a couple of directions. First, we can enlarge the data
to see if the puzzling result of mP = mU holds in other countries. This practice may help
get closer to gaining insights on the underlying mechanism of the puzzle. Second, we can
estimate the efficiency coefficients, β1 , β2 , and β3 , with the help of time series regression to
decide whether the wage rate is sufficiently high or low, which will allow us to tell whether
the countries where mP = mU is observed is unproductive sector–led or not.
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